Tuesday, May 1, 2007
Monday, April 30, 2007
Abd al-Qrim (c. 188o-1963). Berber chieftain who ...
Abd al-Qrim (c. 188o-1963). Berber chieftain who fought the Spaniards and the French in the Rif war of 1920-26. The son of a chief in northern Morocco, he resented the harsh Spanish rule established in 1912 and raised a revolt in 1920. His first operations were guerrilla strikes from the Rif mountains, but in July 192o his forces inflicted a disastrous defeat on the Spanish army at the battle of Annual, killing 12,000 Spaniards, indirectly bringing down the Spanish government and enabling Primo de Rivera to become dictator. Abd al-Qrim then began to organize an independent Rif republic in the mountains. The French intervened when it seemed as if he might become the leader of a movement to liberate Morocco from French control. In 1924 Lyautey, the French Commander, moved his troops into the southern Rif, where they clashed with Abd al-Qrim's forces. By September 1925 French and Spanish armies totalling nearly 5oo,ooo men and backed by tanks and aircraft, under the command of General Primo de Rivera and Marshal Petain, took the offensive against the Rif republic. Within eight months Abd al-Qrim was defeated and surrendered. He was deported to the island of Reunion, where he remained until 1947 when he was given permission to live in France: at Suez he escaped from the ship that was carrying him, and spent the rest of his life in exile in Egypt
Penguin Dictionary of Modern History 1789 1945 (pages 2-3)
Abortion and the Moral Standing of the Fetus
Abortion and the Moral Standing of the Fetus
As in other countries, the abortion debate continues to rage in Canada. But it still generates little light, marked as it is by dishonesty on one side and arrogance on the other. The central issue in the abortion debate is what philosophers call the "moral standing" of the fetus. Does the fetus have the same moral standing as an adult, so is it wrong to kill it whenever it would be wrong to kill an adult? Or does it have less or no standing? Pro-choice presentations are dishonest because they don't state or properly argue for a position on this issue. They concentrate on the right of the woman to control her body or to exercise reproductive freedom. All can agree that women have these rights, but like others, they are limited by any stronger rights in other beings with standing. If abortion involves killing a fetus, and a fetus has full moral standing, its right to life outweighs any rights of the woman Equally dishonest is the argument that abortion, though a difficult issue, is one each woman must decide on her own. This would be reasonable if abortion involved only a woman herself. But if it affects another being with standing, especially if it kills that being, it is just the kind of act Our laws should prohibit. The pro-life side doesn't ignore the issue of the fctus's standing. On the contrary, it makes it the centrepiece of its position. But it is arrogant in assuming this is a simple issue to which it has the simple solution. Most pro-lifers aren’t vegetarians. They don't think it always wrong to kill an animal, and wouldn't hesitate to do so to protect an adult human from even moderate harm. Like most of us, they think adult humans have greater moral standing than animals .Why do adult humans have greater standing than animals' It can’t just be because they're humans. That would be "speciesism," like saying whites count more than Orientals because they're whites. If humans have more standing than animals, they must have special properties that give them this standing. Secular moralists agree what sort of properties these are. Some cite rationality, some uniquely rich enjoyments, some free choice, but all base adult humans' greater standing in some aspect of their unique mental life. This is relevant to the abortion debate. The simplest way to argue that fetuses have the same standing as adults is to say they actually have the properties that give adults that standing. But fetuses don't yet have rationality or rich enjoyments. }f we look at their actual properties, these seem morally indistinguishable from animals'.In his challenge to Canada's old abortion law, Joe Borowski based his argument on the fetus's actual properties. His witnesses testified, for example, that a fetus produces its own blood and. moves away from a needle. But animals too produce blood and avoid needles. How can you show that a fetus has more standing than animals by pointing to properties it shares with animals? The alternative is to argue for the fetus's standing on the basis of its potential. The fetus doesn't now have rationality or rich enjoyments, but unlike any animal, it has the potential to develop into a being that does. This argument also has difficulties. If the fetus has the potential for special properties, why doesn't this give it just the potential for standing, rather than actual standing now? And if the fetus has the potential to develop into a being with a mental life, isn't the same true of an unfertilized sperm and egg? Yet does anyone think contraception is morally equivalent to murder? The pro-life argument faces a dilemma. If we look at the fetus's actual properties, it seems morally indistinguishable from animals. If we look at its potential, it seems indistinguishable from unfertilized cells. This dilemma may be partly avoidable. There may be different meanings of"potential," so a 28-week fetus has the potential for mental life in a more significant sense than unfertilized cells, one that confers moral standing where the other doesn't. On reflection, this has to be so. A 2-week baby doesn't, any more than a fetus, actually have rationality or rich enjoyments. Yet only an extreme view thinks it in principle permissible to kill babies. If babies have full standing this must rest on their potential, which must differ from that of mere cells. This seems the one route to a defensible view about the fetus. But if there are two kinds of potential, one conferring standing while the other doesn't, when does the first, more significant, potential appear? The answer depends on what defines the first potential, which is a difficult philosophical (not medical) issue. But it is unlikely to appear at conception. The relevant potential is for a rich mental life, and differs from the potential of cells. This suggests that it requires the actual presence of the brain structures that will later ground a mental life. These brain structures develop during the second trimester of pregnancy but are not present before. We seem led, then, to a moderate position on abortion, one permitting it early in pregnancy but not later on. When the Canadian government proposed legislation reflecting this position, its draft was attacked as a cynical compromise between two principled views. This assumes that to be principled, moral beliefs must be simple, which is false. If we think seriously about abortion, without dishonestly ignoring the fetus or arrogantly assuming its standing, we may be led to a principled justification of the politically most acceptable view.
QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION
1. Why is it relevant to ask whether those who oppose abortion are vegetarians?
2. Does it make more sense to determine the fetus's standing by looking at the properties it actually has or at its potential?
3. Even if the fetus has full moral standing, are there situations in which its right to life is outweighed by rights of the woman, so abortion is morally permitted? If so, describe some of these situations.
As in other countries, the abortion debate continues to rage in Canada. But it still generates little light, marked as it is by dishonesty on one side and arrogance on the other. The central issue in the abortion debate is what philosophers call the "moral standing" of the fetus. Does the fetus have the same moral standing as an adult, so is it wrong to kill it whenever it would be wrong to kill an adult? Or does it have less or no standing? Pro-choice presentations are dishonest because they don't state or properly argue for a position on this issue. They concentrate on the right of the woman to control her body or to exercise reproductive freedom. All can agree that women have these rights, but like others, they are limited by any stronger rights in other beings with standing. If abortion involves killing a fetus, and a fetus has full moral standing, its right to life outweighs any rights of the woman Equally dishonest is the argument that abortion, though a difficult issue, is one each woman must decide on her own. This would be reasonable if abortion involved only a woman herself. But if it affects another being with standing, especially if it kills that being, it is just the kind of act Our laws should prohibit. The pro-life side doesn't ignore the issue of the fctus's standing. On the contrary, it makes it the centrepiece of its position. But it is arrogant in assuming this is a simple issue to which it has the simple solution. Most pro-lifers aren’t vegetarians. They don't think it always wrong to kill an animal, and wouldn't hesitate to do so to protect an adult human from even moderate harm. Like most of us, they think adult humans have greater moral standing than animals .Why do adult humans have greater standing than animals' It can’t just be because they're humans. That would be "speciesism," like saying whites count more than Orientals because they're whites. If humans have more standing than animals, they must have special properties that give them this standing. Secular moralists agree what sort of properties these are. Some cite rationality, some uniquely rich enjoyments, some free choice, but all base adult humans' greater standing in some aspect of their unique mental life. This is relevant to the abortion debate. The simplest way to argue that fetuses have the same standing as adults is to say they actually have the properties that give adults that standing. But fetuses don't yet have rationality or rich enjoyments. }f we look at their actual properties, these seem morally indistinguishable from animals'.In his challenge to Canada's old abortion law, Joe Borowski based his argument on the fetus's actual properties. His witnesses testified, for example, that a fetus produces its own blood and. moves away from a needle. But animals too produce blood and avoid needles. How can you show that a fetus has more standing than animals by pointing to properties it shares with animals? The alternative is to argue for the fetus's standing on the basis of its potential. The fetus doesn't now have rationality or rich enjoyments, but unlike any animal, it has the potential to develop into a being that does. This argument also has difficulties. If the fetus has the potential for special properties, why doesn't this give it just the potential for standing, rather than actual standing now? And if the fetus has the potential to develop into a being with a mental life, isn't the same true of an unfertilized sperm and egg? Yet does anyone think contraception is morally equivalent to murder? The pro-life argument faces a dilemma. If we look at the fetus's actual properties, it seems morally indistinguishable from animals. If we look at its potential, it seems indistinguishable from unfertilized cells. This dilemma may be partly avoidable. There may be different meanings of"potential," so a 28-week fetus has the potential for mental life in a more significant sense than unfertilized cells, one that confers moral standing where the other doesn't. On reflection, this has to be so. A 2-week baby doesn't, any more than a fetus, actually have rationality or rich enjoyments. Yet only an extreme view thinks it in principle permissible to kill babies. If babies have full standing this must rest on their potential, which must differ from that of mere cells. This seems the one route to a defensible view about the fetus. But if there are two kinds of potential, one conferring standing while the other doesn't, when does the first, more significant, potential appear? The answer depends on what defines the first potential, which is a difficult philosophical (not medical) issue. But it is unlikely to appear at conception. The relevant potential is for a rich mental life, and differs from the potential of cells. This suggests that it requires the actual presence of the brain structures that will later ground a mental life. These brain structures develop during the second trimester of pregnancy but are not present before. We seem led, then, to a moderate position on abortion, one permitting it early in pregnancy but not later on. When the Canadian government proposed legislation reflecting this position, its draft was attacked as a cynical compromise between two principled views. This assumes that to be principled, moral beliefs must be simple, which is false. If we think seriously about abortion, without dishonestly ignoring the fetus or arrogantly assuming its standing, we may be led to a principled justification of the politically most acceptable view.
QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION
1. Why is it relevant to ask whether those who oppose abortion are vegetarians?
2. Does it make more sense to determine the fetus's standing by looking at the properties it actually has or at its potential?
3. Even if the fetus has full moral standing, are there situations in which its right to life is outweighed by rights of the woman, so abortion is morally permitted? If so, describe some of these situations.
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